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THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE COMMON LAW IS APPLIED IN DETERMINING WHAT CONSTITUTES A CRIME, AND THE NATURE
AND DEGREE OF PUNISHMENT CONSEQUENT THEREUPON.
PART I.
HAVE THE NATIONAL COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES A COMMON
LAW CRIMINAL JURISDICTION?
1. Subject of the second part stated.
2-5. The manner in which the United States courts obtain their jurisdiction.
6-8. Hefildd's Case stated and considered.
9, 10. This case properly decided on principles of international law.
11, 12. Ravara Case stated. The question not raised in this case.
13. Question first fairly raised in The United States v. Worrall.
14. Again considered in the Hudson and Goodwin Case.
15. Judge STORY's decision in United States v. Coolidge.
16. Not sustained in the Supreme Court.
17. Other decisions adverse to Judge STORY's views.
18-20. United States v. Williams put on same ground with Henfidd's Case.
21. Cases generally against the holding of Judge SToRY.
22. Several leading text-writers indorse his views.
23. Position taken by them considered unsound.
24-29. Numerous recent cases opposed to their view, settling the question.
30-33. View of Judge TuciKER, &c., agrees with these cases.
34-42. The correct view of the application of the common law in the United
States courts.
43-45. Evils resulting from this limited common-law power.
46. Such evils inseparable from codes'that exclude common-law principles.
47. Codes to receive consideration.
48-51. Chancellor Kent's criticism of Livingston's Louisiana Code.
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52-54. Remarks in" reference to the Code Napoleon.
55. From the evils incident to codes, not surprising that the United States courts
should experience difficulty from their limited common-law power.

1. TnE next question for consideration is, How far the common
law of England is to be considered as applicable to the United
States, at large, and to what extent it is to be adopted as a rule
in criminal cases, arising in the tribunals of the nation, where no
written law has been provided by Congress, defining crimes and
affixing their punishment? Or, in other words, Have the national
courts of the United States a common law criminal jurisdiction ?
This would seem now to be a question of quite as much political,
as of legal, importance.
2. Before entering upon the examination of this question it
may serve to make clearer what may be presented upon the
subject, if the acts, under which the United States courts exercise
their jurisdiction, are enumerated.
8. By a comparatively-late act (Act 23d August 1842, § 3),
the jurisdiction of the District Court has been extended, concurrently with the Circuit Court, to all crimes and offences against
the United States, the punishment of which is not capital. The
exclusive jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is, therefore,, confined
to those offences against the United States not vested concurrently, by Act of Congress, in the courts of the several states,
and which may be punished capitally. In such cases, however,
its jurisdiction is final, unless the judges disagree on a point,
which may be certified to the Supreme Court: Act 29th April
1802, § 6.
4. The Supreme Court derives its jurisdiction from the Constitution, art. 3, §§ 1, 2. The only practical original jurisdiction
which it-.can be said to possess is that inherent in all courts to
punish for contempts offered to its dignity, by fine • and imprisonment: per JQHNSON, J.,in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin,
7 Cranch (S. C.) 32. The Supreme Court, as stated above, has
also appellant jurisdiction in criminal cases when the judges in
the Circuit Court disagree, and certify the case to the Supreme
Court sitting in bane.
5. By the Act to establiih the Judicial Courts of the United
States, it is declared (Act 24th September i789, § 11) that the
Circuit Court shall have c;clusive cognisance of all crimes and
offences cognisable under the authority of the United States,
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except where this act otherwise provides, or the laws of the
United States otherwise direct ; and concurrent jurisdiction with
the District Courts of crimes and offences cognisable therein.
This act confines the jurisdiction over offences against the United
States to the national courts, unless otherwise specified, so it is
important that the question be decided as to the common-law
jurisdiction of the national courts in criinal cases, where the
offence is not cognisable by the courts of any particular state.
For, if the common law is not allowed full force in such cases,
then the national courts will have criminal jurisdiction only
where there is an express statute providing for the case, or class
of cases, under which the offence may fall. Ifthey have not full
common-law power it is manifest that, in all such cases, and
where there is no such direct provision made by statute, offenders
against the universally-acknowledged laws of nature may pass
unscathed.
6. The proper consideration of this important question, which
has been so frequently and ably examined, will involve the necessity of presenting, in detail, the leading cases in which the matter
has been considered. One of the first in point of time, and the
one that has been the most strongly relied on by some writers
(Wharton, e. g., in State Trials, p. 88 n.), who have fancied that
they could establish by it a strong presumption in favor of a full
common-law jurisdiction in the United States courts, is the celebrated Case of Gideon Henfield, Whart. St. Trials 49.
T. The defendant was charged (July 1793) with a 'iolation of
neutrality, by sailing and cruising in a privateer, commissioned
by the French government, and acting against vessels belonging
to the British government; the defendan t being a citizen of the
United States, a neutral power. Judge WILSON, in 8isytarge
to t te grand jury, put the question as one of a violation of the
law of nations, and that the infractions of that law form a part of
the criminal jurisprudence of the common law. The grand jury
returned an indictment against Henfleld, for acting "in violation
of tLe laws of nations, and the constitution and laws of the said
United States of America, and against the peace and dignity of
the said United States of America." The petit jury returned a
verdict of not guilty.
9. When the United States became a member of the great.
family of nations, one of the obligations which was unquestionably.
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cast upon her, *as to be governed by the great principles of
international law, as recognised by all civilized nations. The
question was not whether the common law, as existing in England,
contained international law as one of its ingredients. That did
not at all affect the question. Other nations, as France, Russia,
Prussia, Austria, &c., &c., which have an entirely different system
of law from the comfnon law of England, are all, as a- matter
beyond dispute, governed by the laws of nations; and, whether
the United States had, or had not, adopted the English common
law, they would have been alike bound to act upon and preserve
inviolate the recognised principles of international law. That,
in doing this, they had a right to use, as the machinery for
enforcing the principles of the laws of nations, the forms of law
which they recognised, as the grand jury, the petit jury, bills of
indictment, system of pleading and evidence, &c., &c., which are
a part of the common Iaw,-no one, whatever, has denied. This
was all that was necessary to be held in the case, and it is submitted that the case is, indeed, authority for nothing further;
the loose expression of Judge WILSON, in his charge to the grand
jury, being purely extrajudicial.
10. It is worthy of note that this case has been very generally
cited recently, in connection with the question in dispute with
England, arising out of the "Alabama" matter, to establish the
single point that the fitting out of vessels, by a subject of a
neutral power, to be used against one of two belligerents, is a
violation of neutrality upon principles of international law. To
prove this very liberal citations have been made from Vattel,
Grotius, Bynkershoek, and other old writers on international law.
This, really, is all that the case can be held to have decided.
. 11. The next case to be noticed is that of The United State8
v. Ravara, 2 Dallas 297, tried in April 1798, a few' months prior
to the trial of the Henfield case. The question of the commonlaw jurisdiction of the United States national courts had never
been brought up before, and was not mooted at all in this case.
The principal question considered was as to the relative jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Circuit Courts of the United
States, over offences committed by consuls. WILSON, J.,-with
whom agreed PTERs, J.,-merely said: "I am of opinion that,
although the constitution vests in the Supreme Court an origifial
jurisdiction, in cases like the present, it does not preclude the
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legislature from exercising the powers of vesting a concurrent
jurisdiction, in such inferior courts, as might by law be established. And as the legislature has expressly declared that the
'Circuit Court shall have exclusive cognisance of all crimes and
offences, cognisable under the authority of the United States,' I
think the indictment ought not to be sustained." IREDELL, J.,
differed with this merely on the ground that the term "1original"
seemed to mean " exclusive," and because he thought that the
constitution intended to vest an exclusive jurisdiction in the
Supreme Court, upon all questions relating to the public agents
of foreign nations.
12. As has been observed, the question of the national courts
having a common-law jurisdiction where offences were not otherwise created or declared by the constitution or. by statute, was
not once adverted to. The case, therefore, under the circumstances, cannot be considered of much authority on the point.
13. In The United States v. Worrall, 2 Dallas 384 (A. D. 1798),
the question may be said for the first time to have been fairly and
directly brought before the court. The charge against the defendant whs for an attempt to bribe the commissioner of the
revenue, when the court,-CHASE, J., and PETERS, J.,-divided
on the subject, and the case not having been carried up, the
question was left undecided.
14. The next case to this, of importance, to be noticed, on this
question, is the case of The United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, 7 Cranch 32 (A. D. 1812), where the point was again raised.
This time it was before the Supreme Court on a case certified
from the Circuit Court for the District of Connecticut, wheie the
judges had divided in opinion on the question whether the Circuit Courts of the United States have a common-law jurisdiction
in cases of libel. The question is put more broadly than this by
the court, namely, as to "whether the Circuit Courts of the
United States can exercise a common-law jurisdiction in criminal
cases;" and a majority of the court, reasoning very much in the
same way that Mr. Justice CHASE did in The United States v.
*WorraZl,decided that the legislative authority of the Union must
first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare
the court that shall have jurisdiction of the offence," before such
court can take cognisance of the offence. The powers possessed
by those courts, not immediately derived from statute, being such
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as are necessary to the powers of a court, as to fine for contempt,
imprison for contumacy, &c.
15. The question came up again, during the following year
(A. D. 1813), in the case of The United States v. Coolidge et al.,
1 Gall. 488, in the Circuit Court for Massachusetts, in which
Mr. Justice STORY took the broad ground that the United States
national courts have jurisdiction over common-law offences.
DAVIS, J., did not concur with Judge STORY, in order that the
question might again be taken before the Supreme Court, as the
previous case of Hudson and Goodwin, supra, had been decided
without argument, and by a divided court. As it will be necessary again to advert to the arguments of Mr. Justice STORY, they
are not dwelt upon here.
16. The case of The United States v. Coolidge, 1 Wheat. 415,
came before the Supreme Court, but the attorney-general stated
thati after anxious attention and an examination of the decision
of the court in United States v. Hudson and Goodwin, he
declined arguing the question, and a majority of the court,
although they were willing to hear an argument on the point,
decided, on the authority of the previous case, that the national
courts have no jurisdiction over common-law offences against the
United- States.
17. Two other cases, decided in the Supreme Court by Chief
Justice MARSHALL (United States v. Bevans, 8 Wheat. 886, and
United States v. TF27tberger, 5 Id. 76), are considered as being
governed by the assumption that the United States courts have
no jurisdiction ovei offences at common law, and another Supreme
Court case (United States v. Aaron Burr, 4 Cranch 500) contains a similar idea. The reasoning of the same learned judge
(C. J. MARSHALL) in still another case (Marbury v. Madison, I
Cranch 137; see p. 176) is to the same effect.
18. The case of Isaac Williams, 1 Tucker's Blackstone 436,
tried in the District Court of Connecticut in 1797, involved a
question very similar to the one decided in Henfield's Case,
Whart. St. Trials 49, in which the decision really was, that a
citizen has not the right or power of expatriation. The expression that "the common lawv of this country remains the same as
it was before .the revolution," made use of by Mr. Chief Justice
ELLSWORTH, is, it is conceived, even as regards the national
courts, perfectly true to the extent to which it was necessary to
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it so, in the case in question. To that extent it is consistent with the actual holding in Henfteld's Case, that, as the
act was a violation of the great principles of international law.
by which all nations are governed, the common law is to be
looked to in such cases, not for the declaration of crimes and
punishments against the laws of nations, but for the rules and
forms of proceeding by which the principles of international law
are to be carried into effect. It was not at all necessary for the
court to hold that it derived its jurisdiction over the offence by
virtue of the force or authority of the common law. If there was
no common law whatever in the country, the authority in such
cases would be equally as clear as it is now. This case and
Henfield's Case are both authorities to the effect that the national
courts have jurisdiction over the citizens of the United States,
for violations of its neutrality, but these cases can be sustained
without the doctrine being upheld that the United States courts
possess a common-law criminal jurisdiction.
19. Even Professor Du Ponceau, who, in his work on Jurisdiction, has so strenuously argued for the distinction made by
Judge SToRY-yet to be more particularly adverted to-in the
Coolidge case, virtually admits this. In his remarks on Henfield's Case, he says: "It would seem that the common law,
considered as a principal system, had nothing to do with this
case. The law of nations, being the common law of the civilized
world, may be said, indeed, to be a part of the law of every
civilized nation; but it stands on other and higher grounds than
municipal customs, statutes, edicts, or ordinances. It is binding
on every people and on every government. It is to be carried
into effect at all times under the penalty of being thrown out of
the pale of civilization, or involving the country in a war.
Every branch of the national administration, each within its
distinct and its particular jurisdiction, is bound to administer it.
It defines offences and affixes punishments, and acts everywhere
proprio vigore, whenever it is not altered or modified by particular national statutes, or usages not inconsistent with its great
and fundamental principles. Whether there is or is not a national
common law in other respects, this universal common law can
never cease to be the rule of executive and judicial proceedings
until mankind shall return to the savage state :" Du Ponceau
on Jurisdiction 3,n.
hold
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20. On precisely the same ground the decision in the Williams
case can be sustained; and there is, really, no antagonism between these cases and those of Hudson and Goodwin and Coolidge.
And, in the repeated arguments on this question, the point has
almost always been put as to whether these latter cases, having
been decided without argument, and by a divided court, can be
considered as overruling the former, when, really, without any
inconsistency, they can all be sustained together.
21. The only decided case,' then, that can be said at all to
sustain the idea of a common-law jurisdiction over crimes, in the
national courts, is the Ravara case (see supra), in which, as has
been seen, the question was not mooted at all, and the decision
was put on a ground that has no direct bearing on the point at
issue.
22. The cases above considered, and some few others of a
kindred nature, have been elaborately discussed by a, number
of very able jurists. Mr. Du Ponceau, in a treatise (cited supra)
on the question, has strongly endeavored to enforce the distinction.
first drawn by Judge STORY in the case of Coolidge, that, although
the national courts of the United States, cannot primarily derive
jurisdiction from the common law, yet, when they gain jurisdiction over the person, place, or subject-matter, by the constitution,
or by statute, then the common law comes in and declares what
are offences and how they shall be punished; if no provision to
that effect is made by statute. This view of the question is concurred in by such able writers as Dr. Rawle, in his work on the
Constitution, chap. 29; by Chancellor KENTin his Commentaries,
vol. 1, pp. 364-373; and, again, by Judge STORY, in his work
on the Constitution, vol. 1, p. 106 n. and 552 et seq. (last ed.) ;
All of whom cite approvingly from Du Ponceau. And see Whart.
St. Trials 88, n.
23. However, notwithstanding this brilliant array of names, it
is conceived that the position taken by these able jurists, to te
extent to which it is taken, cannot be sustained.
24. In addition to the cases previously considered, it was laid
down by WASrINGTON, J., to the grand jury (Circuit Court,
Philadelphia, October 1822), that the national courts of the
I But see Uniied States v. Sinth, cited 6 DaL 's Ab., p. 718 a 3, § 4, which
seems to have escaped the notice of Judge STORY, and the other judges and writers
who have contended fbr the common-law jurisdiction.
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United States have not cognisance of offences at common law,
until the jurisdiction is specially given to them by the laws of the
United States: Sergt. Con. Law 345, n. To the same effect is
_x parte Boltman and Swartwout, cited in Conkling's Treatise.
on the Jurisdiction of the National Courts, p. 83.
25. A series of quite recent cases shows that the principle is
considered by the courts as fully established, and no longer a
matter of doubt,-although otherwise alleged in the very latest
editions of the text-books cited, and in other late works,--that
the United States national courts have no jurisdiction over crimes
until such jurisdiction is specially conferred by Congress,naming the crime, and declaring the punishment, and pointing
out the court which shall have jurisdiction over the offence.
26. Thus, in The United State&v. -Lancaster,2 McLean 433
(A. D. 1841), the court held that "the Federal Government has
no jurisdiction of offences at common law. It can exercise no
criminal jurisdiction which is not given by statute, nor punish
any act criminally except as the law provides."
21. In another case (United States v. New Bedford Bridge,
Woodb. & Min. 401), tried A. D. 1846, the court say,--" It is
furthermore held that if Congress does not declare particular acts
to be offences, and prescribe the extent of punishment and place
of trial, though the subject-matter is within the power granted to
the General Government, no particular court has any right to
try a person for doing these acts, or affix any punishment to them,
as every court under the General Government is limited to the
trial and punishment of such matters, and such only, as Congress
has been pleased to confide to it. It has been repeatedly held
that though certain powers are granted to the General Government, it is considered that no acts done against them can usually
be punished as crimes without specific legislation. Thus, it is
said ' the legislative authority of the Union must first make an act
a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the court that shall
have jurisdiction of the offence:'" Ibid. 435. Again,-" The
common law of England has been considered as not put in force,
directly or indirectly, by means of any clause in the constitution
of the United States, so as to create, make, or help to make, anything an offence, which has not-been made so by the constitution
itself, or Acts of Congress passed under it :" Ibid.
28. There are several other cases which are considered by
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commentators on the subject, as also sustaining this position.
The only case, further, however, that will be here cited on the
point is a still later one than any of those others cited, and one,
which, it is conceived, has not been alluded to by any of the textwriters. The case was decided in March 1856 (United States v.
Wilson, 3 Blatch. C. C. 435), in the Circuit Court for the
Southern District of New York, before NELSON and BETTS, JJ.
It is emphatically laid down as "a fundamental doctrine, in
respect to the Federal courts of inferior jurisdiction, that they
cannot take cognisance of criminal offences of any grade, without
the express appointment or direction of positive law. To enable
them to exercise the functions bestowed by the constitution over
crimes and misdemeanors, there must be a designation by positive
law both of the offence and of the tribunal which shall take cognisance of it." This is carrying the doctrine to the extremest
limit, and, in one respect, is stronger than any of the other cases
named.
9. When the limited jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the
-United States is considered,-as_ named in a previous part of this
treatise (see supra, p. 2, § 4),-it may be deemed a point pretty
effectually settled, that the doctrine, in relation to this question,
upheld by Professor Du.Ponceau, by Dr. Rawle, by Mr. Justice
STORY, and by Chancellor KENT, to the extent to which they
carried it, is, notwithstanding the weight of those deservedly
great names, held, conclusively, not to be law.
30. As a partial offset to these great names, and to show that
all the commentators on the question have not been of the same
mind, brief extracts are given from a few eminent writers who
have given expression to views similar to those entertained
herein.
31. Judge TucKER, in his edition of Blackstone's Oommentaries, vol. 4, No. 10 of Appendix, Tucker's Va. Blk., draws the
following conclusions:(1). "'hat the Federal courts possess no jurisdiction whatever
over any crime or misdemeanor, which is an offence by the common law only, and not deelared to be such by the constitution or
some statute of the United States.
(2). "That, although a certain class of offences may, by the
constitution of the United States, be declared to be within the
jurisdiction of the Federal courts, yet those courts cannot pro-
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teed to take cognisance thereof, unless they be first defined by
the constitution, or by statute ; nor to punish them until the
punishment be likewise prescribed by a statute of the United
States." He cites approvingly from Judge CHASE'S argument.
in The United States v. Tforrall, 2 Dallas 394, which, he considers, rests upon a "solid foundation."
32. "1It is to the statutes of the United States, enacted in pursuance of the constitution, alone," says Judge CONKLING in his
Treatise on the Jurisdiction of the National Courts, p. 83, " that
these courts must have recourse to determine what constitutes an
offence against the United States. The United States have no
unmritten criminal code to which resort can be had as a source
of jurisdiction."
33. And, in Sergeant's Constitutional Law, is the following
conclusion :- It seems the judiciary department of the United
States does not possess the implied power, to introduce and carry
into effect the criminal code of the common law, on the plea that
it is necessary.to promote the end and object of its creation, and
to preserve the government. The legislative power is vested in
other departments, and till they make an act a crime, and affix a
punishment to it, it is to be regarded, in the view of the judiciary
of the United States, as innocent. (Even, though, as in one
case, the crime be manslaughter, as it was; or, in another case,
rape ! Such is the consequence resulting from the common law
having been thus ignored.-Auth.) The legislative authority
must likewise, in all cases in which the constitution does not give
the Supreme Court jurisdiction, declare what courts shall have
jurisdiction; as all the other courts of the United States possess
only such jurisdiction as is given to them by Congress:" Ser.
geant's Const. Law, p. 345.
34. This question seems to be settled, yet, as far as this treatise
is concerned, there are incidental questions yet to be decided.
It still remains necessary to consider, from another point of view,
the extent to which the common law is applied by the United
States national courts in determining what constitutes a crime.
The difficult question, which has been examined, having been got
out of the way, the answer is easy, and, in addition to being supported by all the decided cases; including the cases of Henfield
and Williams, it has also the support of the great names of those
who have contended for the more extended influence of the com.
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mon law-Chancellor KENT, Judge STORY, Professor Du Ponceau,
and Dr. Rawle; although they do not seem to have drawn, from
the decided cases, the distinction within its proper limits.
35. "It is not true," says Mr. Spencer, arguendo, in Tie
People v. Vermilyea, 7 Cowen 119, "that the common law is
inapplicable to the criminal courts of the United States, farther
than it respects their jurisdiction. When once legally possessed
of the cause, they uniformly proceed according to the course of
the common law, if not controlled by constitution or statute."
And Judge CONKLING, in his treatise, before named,-" The
national courts are unquestionably to look to the common law, in
the absence of statutable provisions, for rules to guide them, in
the exercise of their functions, in criminal as well as in civil
cases:" Treatise on Jurisdiction, &c., 82.
86. The declaration of rights, providing, that, in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused cannot be deprived of his life, liberty,
or property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of
the land (§ 9), and the term "principles and usages of law," and
other kindred expressions used by Congress in the judicial, and
other acts, have been held to be, and undoubtedly are, a recognition of the existence of the common law as in force in the United
States, as the means by which the jurisdiction derived by the
United States courts from the constitution, or from Acts of Congress, is to be carried into effect: 1 Kent's Com. 336.
37. Kent asks,--" If the common law he a rule of decision in
the exercise of the lawful jurisdiction of the Federal courts, why
ought it not to apply to criminal as well as to civil cases, and
upon the same principle, when jurisdiction is clearly vested ?"
Ibid. 341.
. 38. Clearly it ought. But the mistake made, is, in supposing
that not only the rules and modes of procedure of the common
law are to be looked to, but that, also, when the courts have
jurisdiction over the person, place, or subject-matter, the common
law has to be looked to, in the absence of statutory definitions or
declarations, to ascertain crimes and to declare their punishment.
Omitting this error, nothing can be more correct than Judge
SToRY's argument in United States v. Coolidge, I Gall. 488;
or, than Professor Du Ponceau's elaborate argument, in his
treatise on the question.
39. Indeed, it is conceived, that, in no way can the law be
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more correctly stated, as acted upon in all the cases, than by
adopting Judge STORY'S view, in the case last cited, merely
omitting those parts where he contends that "the nature and
extent" of the authority given by Congress, must be regulated,.
not by the statute, but by the common law. Thus, it is not
questioned in any of the cases that "when once an authority is
lawfully given . . . . the mode in which it shall be exercised
must be regulated by the common law :" Ibid.
40. The following extracts, from the same opinion, clearly and
succinctly point out the full extent to which the common law is
applied by the national courts of the United States in determining
what are crimes :---" Whether the common law of England, in its
broadest sense," says this able judge, "' including equity and
admiralty, as well as legal doctrines, be the common law of the
United States or not, it can hardly be doubted, that the constitution and laws of the United States are predicated upon the existence of the common law. This has not, as I recollect, been
denied by any person, who has maturely weighed the subject,
and will abundantly appear upon the slightest examination. The
constitution of the United States, for instance, provides that ' the
trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by
jury.' I suppose that no person can doubt, that for the explanation of these terms, and for the mode of conducting trials by jury,
recourse must be had to the common law. So, the clause that
'the judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity
arising under the constitution,' &c., is inexplicable, without reference to the common law:" Ibid. 489.
41. "Innumerable instances of a like nature may be adduced.
I will mention but one more, and that is in the clause, providing,
that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless, when in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public
safety may require it. What is the writ of habeas corpus.
What is the privilege which it grants? The common law, and
that alone, furnishes the true answer. The existence, therefore,
of the common law is not only-supposed by the constitution, but
is appealed to for the construction and interpretation of its
powers."
42. Again,-" Congress has provided for the punishment of
murder, manslaughter, and perjury, under certain circumstances,
but it has nowhere defined these crimes. Yet, no doubt is evr
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entertained on trials, that the explanation of them must be sought
and exclusively governed by the common law; and, upon any
other supposition, the judicial power of the United States would
be left, in its exercise, to the mere arbitrary pleasure of the
judges, to an uncontrollable and undefined discretion. Whatever may be the dread of the common law, I presume, that such
a despotic power could hardly be deemed more desirable.. ....
The invariable usage of these courts has been, in all cases not
governed by state laws, to regulate the pleadings (by) the common
law. . . In criminal cases, the right of trial by jury is preserved,
but the proceedings are not specifically regulated. The forms
of the indictment and pleadings, the definition and extent of the
crime, in some cases the right of challenge, and in all the admission and rejection of evidence, are left unprovided for. Upon
what ground, then, do the courts apply, in such cases, the rules
of the common law? I can perceive no correct ground, unless it
be, that the legislature have constantly had in view the rules of
the common law, and deemed their application in casibus omissis
(to matters of proceedings, &c.-Aut.) peremptory upon the
courts :" Ibid. 491-494.
43. All the difficulties arising out of this limited common-law
influence, in connection with criminal cases, over the decisions
of the national courts, have been pointed out by Story, Kent,
and others, and are clearly admitted.
44. Even Judge CHAsE, while contending in The United
States v. Worrall, that the United States national courts have
not "' a common-law power over crimes," observed,-" Upon the
whole it may be a defect in our political institutions; it may be
an inconvenience in the administration of justice, that the commonlaw authority, relating to crimes and punishments, has not been
conferred upon the government of the Uuited States,-which is a
government in other respects, also, of a limited jurisdiction,but judges cannot remedy political imperfections, nor supply any
legislative omission:" 2 Dallas 395.
45. In some of the cases already cited, the evil resulting from
this limited common-law power of the national courts was very
glaring. In one case the crime of manslaughter, committed on
board a United States ship, passed without punishment; because,
although Congress had provided for the punishment of murder,
when so committed, it had omitted the necessary provision for
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the punishment of the smaller offence, and the criminal passed
unscathed. In another case, the crime of rape was allowed to
pass unpunished, because it was committed by a consul, over
whom, ex officio, the United States had exclusive jurisdiction,
and Congress had made no statutory provision for such an offence,'
when committed by a person so situated.
46. These are difficulties which, as experience shows, are almost
inseparable from confining criminal jurisdiction strictly to written
codes. Such difficulties have rendered it necessary for the judges
in one state, where they relied on a code, to fall back upon the
principles of the common law, "in order to prevent the complete
failure of justice." I In another state, where enormous labor has
been expended on statutory provisions with a view. to the perfection of a criminal code, they have still to resorb to the old
common-law principles, and precedents, and judicial expositions,
in order to give their legislation its necessary effect. 2 And even
'in Louisiana, where they had prepared for them, by Mr. Livingston, one of the most highly-praised criminal codes that has everbeen adopted by a state,' they seem to have been compelled to
engraft upon their criminal laws, the all-pervading and controlling
principles of the common law: Louisiana Rev. St. for 1856,
p. 160.
47. In this connection (as the subject of the dissertation is
closely allied to the question) a few remarks in reference to
criminal codes, which some seem to think might be easily and
safely made entirely to supersede the common law, may not be
deemed out of place.
48. The following extracts from a lettr, under date of 13th
March 1826, to the author and compiler of the code above alluded
to, which is generally known as the Louisianean Code, will be
found of interest. "I believe," says Mr. Justice KENT, "I have
heretofore declared against the annihilation of all constructive
offences. This you have done at page 12, and I think it presupposes a perfect legislation, and much more perfect than I apprehend it to be in the power of any one or more individuals to make
I Virginia.

See Commonwealthv. Adcock, 8 Gratt. 661, 675; per Tnosn'oH, J.

2 New York. See Pomeroy's municipal Law (A. D. 1864), § 332.
3 M.fr. Livingston's code seems not to have been adopted in Louisiana. Their
criminal code is founded upon the old civil law, and is modified by the common
law; combining the excellencies of both: 1 Bish. Crim. Law, § 15, n. 4.
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a code. I entertain the most thorough conviction that under a
government that punishes nothing either of omission or commission, but what is within the letter of a written law, a great deal
of fraud and villany, and abuse and offence, will escape unpunished. I will show precisely wherein I think your code is
lamentably deficient in the attempt to bring an offence within the
letter of the law. It is impossible to define expressly and lite.
rally every offence that ought to be punished; and if you ask me
what is the evidence of its being an offence if not defined in the
code, I answer, the laws of nature, of religion, of morality, which
are written in the breast of every son and daughter of Adam,
declare the offence :" 16 Am. Jurist 861.
49. The whole letter is a very able vindication of the common
law, and the learned critic thinks that "our ancestors had as
much wisdom and knowledge of human nature as we have, and
that we ought to revere their maxims, and carry our reforming,
hand lightly and tremblingly over their works." From this very
severe critique upon a much-praised code, the following representative passages are selected, as all for which room can be
made:50. "You say that if an attorney being engaged and consulted
on the merits, shall, on account of.non-payment of fees,.or for any
other cause, appear for the opposite party, he is to be imprisoned,
&c. You make this a public offence. He may have been consulted, and nothing material disclosed, and his client then refuses
to pay and means to cheat or defraud him, and yet you inflexibly
inflict imprisonment, and in your code there is no pardon,but for
innocence detected and certain reformation. I think it is a great
deal better and wiser to leave the government of attorneys to the
discretion of the courts, so if he detains his client's papers when
he has no lien, he is to be suspended, &c.. Now your code admits
of no equity. We must follow the letter; then suppose this
attorney had notice of the claim of a third person to the papers,
and he retains them until the right is settled by a bill of interpleader, must he still be punished, or may the spirit of the law,
in this instance, be followed ? I condemn the whole provision as
dangerously severe, and it appears to me that the *old English
law is better and safer.
51. "I am entirely against the abolition of the common-law
doctrine of vontempts, and your substitute I humbly conceive to
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be wholly inadequate. Your provision is that all contempts are
to be the subject of indictment and trial by jury. Now I beg
leave to say that the jury are wholly incompetent to judge of
what is or is not decorous or insulting language to a court. If a
judge was called a blockhead or a fool, one-half of the rude'
vulgar jurors of the country might think it a very smart and
possil ly a very true saying. Besides, the remedy by indictment
is toc slow. Must a judge sit and hear the contempt and wait
six n onths before the trial in a criminal court can afford him
redr -ss ? Besides, you make no provision for insulting gestures,
or looks, or actions. You say that if any person by words, or
by making a clamor or noise, wilfully, &c., he may be removed
and punished. So, if he use any indecorous, contemptuous, or
insulting expressions, in the OPINION OF A juiy, he is to be
punished. So, if he obstruct the proceedings of the court by
violence or threats, he shall be fined, &c. Here is all the provision for contempts. All other contempts are abolished, and all
these contempts must be tried on indictment, or information, in
the usual form. Now I say you do not reach a thousand nameless, but gross and abominable contempts, that may be offered in
court. The impudent or malicious offender can, Proteus-like,
elude all your rattling chains, ana insult with impunity. Insults
to a court ought to be punished with the celerity of lightning,
and here you wait the slow process of indictment for an open
insult to the bench. I never would accept a judicial office under
any government, if I was to be left so naked and defenceless as
you in this chapter leave the Louisiana judges. It is by far the
most exceptionable, the most distressingly exceptionable, part of
the penal code :" Ibid. 366 et seq.
52. And of a still more celebrated code, the Code Napolkon,
one of its compilers (M. Portalis) says,--" No matter how perfect a code may be, it is no sooner finished than a thousand
questions present themselves. It would be a monstrous error to
suppose, that a body of laws could be framed which would provide for all possible cases. So varied are the wants of society,
so active the intercourse between men, and so extended their
relations, that it is impossible for the legislator to provide for
every emergency. The office of law is only to fix general
maxims of right, to establish principles fruitful of consequences,
VOL. XV.-1O

